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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the underpricing of IPOs on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius 
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inception of the SEM until 2010, the results show an average degree of underpricing 
within the range 10 to 20%. Using a regression approach, we demonstrate that the 
aftermarket risk level and auditor’s reputation both have a significant positive impact on 
initial returns. We propose the use of the Z-score as a composite measure of a firm’s ex 
ante financial strength, and find that it has a significant negative effect on the degree of 
short-run underpricing. 
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1. Introduction 
Undoubtedly, initial public offerings (IPOs) have generated an enormous amount of 
public interest and are one of the most researched areas in finance. Common empiricisms 
have shown that IPOs are subject to three well documented anomalies, namely, the short-
run underpricing of IPOs, the hot issue market phenomenon and the long-run 
performance of IPOs. With regard to short-run underpricing, issuers offer shares to 
investors at prices considerably below the subsequently revealed market value. The 
underpricing of IPOs is anomalous in the sense that it appears to contradict the efficient 
markets hypothesis. In particular, one would expect the underpricing of IPOs to disappear 
over time as the overwhelming majority of investors will recognise the implied profit 
opportunities and make good use of them. However, the underpricing of IPOs seems to 
be persistent in most markets. Also, it would be difficult to rationally justify the 
behaviour of existing owners to sell shares to outsiders at discounted prices. The fact that 
these anomalies exist in numerous developed and developing markets makes them even 
more difficult to explain.  
 
There are a number of theoretical explanations and models underpinning this IPO 
underpricing. The popular justifications for this observed phenomenon rest upon the 
possible existence of information asymmetries, mainly in the form of ex ante 
uncertainties about share prices.
1
 Also, according to Welch (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), and other similar studies,
2
 there exists a signalling mechanism where firms send 
signals to the market by underpricing their IPOs. Moreover, there are other possible 
explanations such as underwriter reputation theories, investor sentiment theories and 
prospect theories to explain the degree of underpricing in the IPO market.  
 
However, there are still gaps in the literature as most studies have focused on the 
developed and well known developing markets. Essentially, the newness of the Mauritian 
market, the relative lack of investor sophistication and the distinct institutional features 
make the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) a unique environment in which to conduct 
                                                 
1
 Rock (1986), Ritter (1984), Ritter (1991), Garfinkel (1993), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), and Adjasi 
et al. (2011) amongst others. 
2
 For example, Leland and Pyle (1977), Espenlaub and Tonks (1998), Kim et al. (2004), Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001), Francis and Hasan (2001), and Loughran and Ritter (1995; 2002). 
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research. Additionally, very little research has conducted with regard to IPOs in African 
markets and the literature is not abundant relative to that on developed markets such as 
the US and the UK. This may be explained by the fact that most stock exchanges
3
 in 
Africa are relatively young and indeed, most were set up in the early 1990’s. In 
particular, there are only two previous studies that have been undertaken on Mauritian 
IPOs by Gasbarro et al. (2003) and Bundoo (2007), focusing on the aftermarket 
performance and underpricing of IPOs. However, both studies are subject to some 
caveats. First, the sample periods of those studies are limited. In fact, the first study only 
contains firms which are listed from 1989 until 1996, while the second study takes into 
account firms listed until 2004. Also, for both studies, some firms are not included in the 
sample. Second, the studies do not consider the significance of the signalling and 
underwriter reputation hypotheses in explaining the degree of underpricing. Third, the 
studies do not examine the issuing activity of seasoned equity offerings on the SEM. 
Fourth, the studies do not consider the motives for going public on the SEM. Given these 
limitations, a reassessment of the market conditions of Mauritian IPOs seems warranted. 
Therefore, this paper aims to fill the research gap by addressing all the limitations present 
in both studies. In effect, the focus of the research is to take into account all firms listed 
on the SEM from 1989 until 2010.  
 
Moreover, the methodological contribution of this research is to develop a good proxy for 
the ex ante uncertainty of the firm in explaining the underpricing of IPOs based on the 
Altman Z-score model. Indeed, prior studies have focused on various proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty based on different accounting ratios. However, most of these accounting 
ratios reflect a single aspect of the firm at one time. For example, the financial leverage 
ratio will reflect the ex ante uncertainty of the firm by capturing only the gearing level of 
the company. On the other hand, the Z-score takes into account several characteristics of 
the firm simultaneously, namely liquidity, profitability, productivity of assets, gearing 
and income generating ability. To the knowledge of the authors, application of the Z-
score as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty to explain the short-run underpricing of IPOs has 
not been considered so far in the literature. 
                                                 
3
 Based on the UNDP 2003, African Stock Market Handbook.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the key 
contributions in the literature on the underpricing of initial public offerings. Section 3 
briefly describes the Stock Exchange of Mauritius and the institutional framework. 
Section 4 outlines the methodology employed, while the results are presented and 
analysed in Section 5, with Section 6 offering concluding remarks.  
 
2. Prior Research 
Though many studies have been conducted in different markets, the IPO market in the 
United States remains the most extensively examined. Overall, with a few exceptions, 
most studies claim an average initial return in the 10-20% range in the US IPO markets.
4
 
With regards to the European markets, the studies show that the average level of 
underpricing can be below 10% in some European countries and above 20% in other 
markets.
5
  However, compared to the European, the US markets and Latin American 
markets
6
, the average underpricing in most Asian stock markets
7
 is considerably higher. 
Yet one has to be cautious in any comparisons made across markets as consideration has 
to be given to the differences in sample size, time-frame and methodologies in calculating 
the average initial returns across the studies. Considering the African markets, the 
empirical evidence is limited relative to research work in other developed and emerging 
markets. In particular, the stock markets are relatively young. With the possible exception 
of South Africa, academic research on IPO issues in general is either limited or non-
existent.
8
    
 
Overall, the degree of underpricing varies from country to country. Indeed, the 
characteristics pertaining to each market are distinct. Some markets are known to be 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, Ritter (1991), Ibbotson et al. (1994), Ritter and Welch (2002), Bommel, Dahya, and Shi 
(2005), Lowry et al. (2010), and Chahine and Saade (2011). 
5
 E.g., Jelic and Briston (2003), Kazantzis and Levis (1995), Levis (1993), Ljungqvist (1997), Lyn and 
Zychowicz (2002), Günther and Rummer (2006), Gounopoulos, Nounis, and Stylianides (2007), Boulton et 
al. (2007), and Banerjee et al. (2011). 
6
 Aggarwal et al. (1993), Brau et al. (2009) 
7
 E.g., Kim et al. (1993), Hameed and Lim (1998), Isa and Yong (2003), Hibara and Mathew (2004), Chen, 
Choi, & Jiang (2007), Chorruk and Worthington (2010), Samarakoon (2010), and Moshiran, Ng and Wu 
(2010).  
8
 A few noteworthy published studies on African markets are Reyneke and Page (1997), Omran (2005), 
Gasbarro, Bundoo and Zumwalt (2003),Alli, Subrahmanyam and Gleason (2008) and Adjasi et al. (2011). 
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highly sophisticated and well developed; others are termed emerging markets while a few 
markets will be regarded as small and underdeveloped. Prior studies in emerging markets 
are significant to this research given that the Mauritian market can be categorised as a 
relatively young and emerging market. As such, the literature in the context of emerging 
markets show that IPOs from the Chinese, Bangladesh and Indian markets
9
 seems to 
enjoy the highest average initial returns (more than 90%). In particular, Jenkinson and 
Ljunqvist (2001) claim that these levels are higher relative to other emerging markets. 
However, the existing evidence of underpricing in other Asian emerging markets shows 
initial returns of 21.43%, 61.81% and 70.30% in Hong Kong, Malaysian and Korean markets 
respectively.10 In particular, it seems that the emerging Asian markets are experiencing a 
much larger degree of underpricing than markets in any other region.  
 
2.1 Theories and Models of Underpricing 
A simple theoretical framework integrating all factors affecting underpricing does not yet 
exist. Therefore, a number of competing theoretical models have been developed to 
explain the initial underpricing of stocks. The main theories found in the IPO literature 
are the Winner’s Curse hypothesis, Bookbuilding theories, the Principal-Agent 
hypothesis, Signalling theories, the Law-suit avoidance hypothesis, the Ownership and 
Control hypothesis and the Investor Sentiment theory. 
 
One of the most important models of underpricing is the one developed by Rock (1986) 
based on the winner’s curse hypothesis. Rock distinguishes between informed and 
uninformed investors. If the issues are underpriced, IPOs will be oversubscribed by 
informed investors, resulting in a limited number of shares being available to uninformed 
investors. If the issues are overpriced, IPOs will be sold exclusively to uninformed 
investors who will earn negative initial returns. Thus, uninformed investors will be 
winning the entire issue but at an unfavourable price, creating a situation termed the 
winner’s curse. In order to keep uninformed investors in the IPO market, securities are 
offered at a discount from their expected after market prices. Thus, according to the 
                                                 
9
 See Chen, Choi, & Jiang (2007) for the Chinese market, Islam et al. (2010) for the Bangladesh market and 
Ghosh S. (2002) for the Indian market. 
10
 Moshiran, Ng and Wu (2010). 
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Winner’s Curse theory, IPO underpricing should decrease if the information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors is reduced. One of the most common actions 
to reduce underpricing is to seek assistance from a prestigious underwriter or auditor to 
certify the quality of the issue.
11
 This may decrease the number of informed investors in 
the market and as such, reduce the winner’s curse problem.  However, more recently, 
Hoberg (2007) and Liu and Ritter (2011) claim that prestigious underwriters will 
underprice more as they benefit from underpricing. In particular, Hoberg (2007) predicts 
that “high underpricing underwriters have access to superior information, and they use 
their advantage to win mandates with more valuable issuers.” The empirical evidence as 
to whether more prestigious underwriters are associated with lower underpricing is 
mixed. On one hand, Carter and Manaster (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
using data on the US market from the 1970s and 1980s, find a negative relationship 
between initial returns and underwriter reputation, whilst on the other, Beatty and Welch 
(1996), using data from the 1990s, claim a positive relationship. According to Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), the shift in this relationship may be due to a strategic decision by 
prestigious banks either to favour their investment clients or to weaken their criteria for 
selecting IPOs.        
 
Furthermore, Beatty and Ritter (1986) extended Rock’s model of underpricing to predict 
a positive relationship between underpricing and ex ante uncertainty. According to Beatty 
and Ritter (1986), the greater the ex ante uncertainty about the value of a new issue, the 
greater will be the associated information asymmetry, leading to higher underpricing. In 
line with this idea, empirical studies have employed various proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty. According to Ljungqvist (2006), the proxies can be loosely categorized into 
four groups: company characteristics, offering characteristics, prospectus disclosure, and 
aftermarket variables. Considering company characteristics, some studies have used 
age,
12
 firm size,
13
 or industry.
14
 For instance, Beatty and Ritter (1986) predict a negative 
                                                 
11
 Booth and Smith (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990), Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) and Carter et al. (1998). 
12
 Ritter (1984), Ritter (1991), Garfinkel (1993) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), and Adjasi et al. 
(2011). 
13
Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Levis (1990), and Adjasi et al. (2011). 
14
Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003), and Al-Hassan et al. (2010). 
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relationship between a firm’s size and underpricing given that small firms’ prices are 
assumed to be more volatile and uncertain. According to Beatty and Ritter (1986), the 
size of IPOs can be used as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty about their ex post value. The 
existing evidence on IPO performance suggests that a smaller issue is more likely to have 
greater initial underpricing followed by a worse aftermarket performance. Also, risk 
factors
15
 and uses of gross proceeds
16
 disclosed in the prospectus, can serve as proxies for 
ex ante uncertainty.  
 
Similarly, some studies
17
 have focused on aftermarket variables such as volatility or 
trading volume. For instance, Reber and Fong (2006), using a sample of 100 Singaporean 
initial public offerings (IPOs) during the period 1998-2000, find a positive and significant 
relationship between underpricing and after-market trading volume on the first day of 
trading. 
  
On the other hand, bookbuilding theories
18
 consider underpricing as a mechanism used 
by underwriters to extract private information from investors. The theory predicts higher 
levels of underpricing to be associated with higher levels of information asymmetry 
between underwriters and investors.  In effect, based on the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) 
framework, the investment bank can provide some incentives to reveal truthful 
information mainly in terms of awarding the issue to investors that bid in the most 
aggressive way against those that bid conservatively. However, for investors to be 
aggressive and wanting to reveal their information, underwriters will have to ‘leave 
money on the table,’ i.e. the issues will have to be underpriced.   
 
Moreover, the principal-agent model documents the information asymmetry between 
issuers and underwriters, with the latter having an expertise in marketing shares. As such, 
the underwriter has an incentive to underprice the shares either to reduce marketing 
                                                 
15
 Beatty and Welch (1996), and Jog and Wang (2002). 
16
 Beatty and Ritter (1986), Islam et al. (2010), and Samarakoon (2010). 
17
 Miller and Reilly (1987), Ritter (1984, 1987), Wasserfallen and Wittleder (1994), and Reber and Fong 
(2006). 
18
 Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Hanley (1993), Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) and Jenkinson and Jones 
(2004). 
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efforts or to favour some established clients. According to Loughran and Ritter (2004), 
there is a principal-agent problem between the issuer (principal) and the underwriter 
(agent) in that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. To this 
effect, Baron (1982) argues that investment banks (underwriters) have an incentive to 
underprice as a way of favouring their established clients. There are mechanisms such as 
underwriting fees being dependent on IPO proceeds that can control the agency problem 
faced by issuers. However, underwriters may, at times, be rewarded more by the 
commissions received from underpricing the issues than by the increase in underwriting 
fees.  
 
Other theoretical models posit the idea of underpricing as a signalling mechanism used 
by firms. Based on the signalling models developed by Welch (1989) amongst others,
19
 
high quality firms underpriced their IPOs in order to signal their high valuations to the 
market. In fact, underpricing in such cases will initially bring reduced issue proceeds to 
the firm but will “leave a good taste in investors’ mouths.”20 However, given the initial 
good signal sent to the market, the firm will be able to make a subsequent seasoned 
offering at a higher price. Thus, the initial reduction in issue proceeds is assumed to be 
recovered in subsequent offerings. Therefore, underpricing is viewed as a signal of firm 
quality in the market. However, according to Allen and Faulharber (1989), underpricing 
is just one among several variables which can be used to signal a given firm’s quality. 
For instance, the choice of underwriters,
21
 choice of auditors,
22
 board of directors, 
operating results, etc. can be used to covey information about a firm’s quality 
 
Furthermore, the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis claims that companies underprice their 
shares to reduce the probability of lawsuits from investors due to any omissions or errors 
in the prospectus.
23
 Ritter (1998) argues that this hypothesis is consistent with the 
provision of the Securities Act 1933 in the US, where omissions of significant materials 
can set off lawsuits. Consistent with the predictions of the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, 
                                                 
19
 Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Ravid and Spiegel (1997). 
20
 Ibbotson (1975). 
21
 Booth and Smith (1986), and Corwin and Schultz (2005). 
22
 Titman and Trueman (1986), Beatty (1989), and Adjasi et al. (2011). 
23
 Based on the basic idea of Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). 
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Banerjee et al. (2011) claim a positive relationship between the accessibility of legal 
recourse and IPO underpricing using a sample of 8,776 IPOs from 36 countries. 
However, according to Ljungqvist (2006), the securities laws are specific in that some 
countries do have strict liability laws. Yet, underpricing is observed worldwide. As such, 
the lawsuit hypothesis may be regarded as a second driver of underpricing. Indeed, many 
researchers
24
 have concluded that the probability of lawsuits is insignificant in markets 
such as Australia, Japan, Germany, the UK, Finland, etc.  
 
In addition, Brennan and Franks (1997) consider monitoring costs as an incentive to 
underprice. They develop the reduced monitoring hypothesis to claim that firms have an 
incentive to underprice the IPO of their firm’s stock to ensure its wide distribution, thus 
reducing the likelihood of being monitored or removed by new shareholders, and in 
particular, by large institutional shareholders. Managers or directors have some private 
benefits, which may not be consistent with the benefits of shareholders or non-directors. 
As such, there is a conflict of interest or an agency problem between managing and non-
managing shareholders. Within this agency-cost framework, Brennan and Franks (1997) 
argue that managers have an incentive for more diffused ownership through the 
underpricing of shares to avoid being monitored by a large outside shareholder. In effect, 
managers use underpricing as a means of control.  
 
Based on the information cascades theory, Welch (1992) argues that issuing companies 
underprice to attract the first few potential investors to buy, and thereby induce a cascade 
in which all subsequent investors want to buy irrespective of their private information. In 
such a situation, investors look into whether the issues are strongly demanded or not 
before deciding to subscribe. Essentially, subsequent investors, ignoring their own private 
information, would examine the reactions of earlier investors. Hence, it can be argued 
that companies underprice to set up a cascade effect to attract those subsequent investors.  
 
Finally, investor sentiment theories argue that optimism from investors will lead to the 
underwriter setting a higher offer price beyond the fundamental price as it is expected 
                                                 
24
 Ljungqvist (1997) and Keloharju (1993). 
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that these investors will buy shares in the aftermarket. However, as the price reverts to its 
fundamental value in the long run, underperformance is observed. To this effect, 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1991) document fads or overvaluations in the IPO market using a 
sample of 1598 offerings for the period 1977-87. Essentially, they find that prices fall in 
the year following their offerings. Also, Ritter and Welch (2002) report over-enthusiasm 
among retail investors which may account for the initial trading price rise as well as for 
low aftermarket returns on the first few years. Additionally, Derrien (2005) documents a 
positive link between investor sentiment, proxied by large individual investors’ demands, 
and high initial returns.  
 
3. An Overview of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius (SEM) 
The Stock Exchange Act was enacted in 1988 to provide for the setting up of a Stock 
Exchange Commission (SEC), a regulatory body, as well as the Stock Exchange of 
Mauritius Ltd (SEM), a private company, established to operate and maintain the stock 
exchange. On 5 July 1989, the first trading session took place with five companies listed 
on the official market. Also, the SEMDEX,
25
 a market-weighted index, was created to 
reflect the collective price movements of all companies listed on the official market. In 
1990, the over the counter (OTC) market, now known as the Development and Enterprise 
market (DEM), and the debt market, were launched. Furthermore, the official market of 
the Stock Exchange has categorised the companies listed into 7 sectors – namely, Banks 
and Insurance, Industry, Investments, Sugar, Commerce, Leisure & Hotels, and 
Transport.  
           
Other major developments in the Mauritian equity market include the setting up of a 
centralised clearing and settlement system in 1997, the setting up of a new regulatory 
body known as the Financial Services Commission in 2001, and the implementation of 
the Stock Exchange of Mauritius Automated Trading System (SEMATS), replacing the 
open-outcry single auction method and the replacement of the old Stock Exchange Act 
1988 by the Securities Act 2005, amongst others. 
                                                 
25
 The SEMDEX is an all shares index.  It reflects capitalisation based on each listed stock which is 
weighted according to its shares in the overall market.  The current value of the SEMDEX is expressed in 
relation to a base period, 5 July 1989, with a value of 100. 
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4. Research Methodology 
4.1 Sample and Data Collection Methods 
The sample used in this study consists of all Mauritian firms which went public on the 
official market of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius for the period 1989 until 2010. Given 
the limited number of firms, we have included those which delisted during the sample 
period.
26
 However, Gasbarro et al. (2003) argue that the sample size is also relatively 
small in other emerging market IPO studies. For instance, Hameed and Lim (1998) and 
Omran (2005) both use a sample size of 53 firms to assess IPO anomalies on the 
Singaporean and Egyptian markets respectively. There are also other studies such as Lyn 
and Zychowicz (2002), and Dawson (1987), who consider 33 and 21 new issues on the 
Hungarian and Malaysian markets respectively.  
 
Four types of data are required for the purpose of the study: prospectus data, annual 
reports, publications by the stock exchange and share price data. The prospectus is used 
to collect data prior to listing. These include the offer price, issue details, dates and 
amounts, the sponsoring stockbroker, the auditor, and financial information from balance 
sheets and income statements. However, for some firms there is no prospectus and in 
such cases the annual reports before the year of listing are used to collect ex ante 
information. Also, information on the issue details of such firms is manually collected 
from the Registrar of Companies, which keeps files for all private and public companies 
in Mauritius. Furthermore, the SEM Handbook, which provides a five year summary of 
income statements and balance sheets for all listed companies, is also consulted. 
Moreover, the SEM Factbook, an annual publication issued by the SEM to disseminate 
information to investors, is used to collect information on the main market indicators as 
well as information pertaining to rights issues and bonus issues by listed companies. In 
addition, daily price histories were collected for each sample firm through the period 
1989 to 2010. In particular, daily share price data for all sample firms from the listing 
date up to three years subsequent to listing are obtained from the SEM’s own quotes as 
well as from different stock broking companies. Finally, the SEMDEX values for the 
period 1989 to 2010 are collected to proxy the market returns.      
                                                 
26
 There are seven firms which have delisted during the period 1989-2010. The SEM codes for these firms 
are CIT, COURTS, DELPHIS, GBH, LIT, MDA(O) and MOUNT. 
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4.2 Underpricing Measurement 
There are a number of methods available to compute a measure for underpricing. For 
comparative purposes, the basic methodology followed in this study is similar to those 
used in earlier studies.
27
 A simple, raw measure of underpricing or first day initial return 
(Ri1) for each firm is calculated from the date of issue as follows: 
     1)/( 011  iii PPR                             (1) 
where 0iP  is the offer price of the firm i, 1iP is the first day closing prices of the shares in 
firm i, and 1iR  is the total first day return on the stock. 
 
If markets are highly volatile such that there is a major change in the price of most stocks 
during the IPO period, then initial returns should be market adjusted. To compute the first 
day market adjusted return, the return of the market index is initially calculated as 
1)/( 011  mmm PPR                               (2) 
where 1mR  is the one-day return for the market index (SEMDEX) corresponding to the 
offering by firm i, 1mP  is  the  closing value of the market index on the issue date 
corresponding to the offering by firm i and 0mP  is the value of the market index 
corresponding to the offering price of the firm i .                    
            
The market adjusted return abnormal return for each IPO on the first trading day is 
therefore computed as: 
  }1)]1/()1{[(100 111  mii RRMAAR       (3) 
where 1iMAAR  is the one day excess return corresponding to the issue by firm i, 1iR  is the 
one day return for firm i, and 1mR  is the one day return for the market index 
corresponding to the offering by the firm i.     
 
                                                 
27
 See the studies from McDonald and Fisher (1972), Aggarwal, Leal and Hernadez (1993), Affleck-
Graves, Hegde and Miller (1996), Dongwei and Fleisher (1999), Mok and Hui (1998), and Paudyal, 
Saadouni and Briston (1998). 
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However, the measure in equation (3) rests upon the assumption that the systematic risk 
of the IPOs under consideration is the same as that of the index. Indeed, it is highly 
unlikely that the betas of the IPOs average to unity, as a number of studies (e.g., Ibbotson 
(1975), and Affleck et al. (1996)) have shown that the average betas of the newly listed 
firms are systematically higher than one. As such, the 1iMAAR  may be upwardly biased 
in the sense that a higher initial performance of the IPO relative to the market could be 
observed.
28
   
 
 The average first day initial return ( 1iR ) and the average first day market adjusted return 
( MAAR ) are calculated as 
1
1
1
1
i
N
i
i RN
R 

         (4) 
1
1
1
i
N
i
MAAR
N
MAAR 

        (5) 
 
According to Kooli and Suret (2002), first day returns are generally appropriate where 
there is no time gap between the application closing date and the first day of trading. As 
such, some studies
29
 have used first week or first month returns to assess the degree of 
underpricing. The time gap for the Mauritian market is relatively long compared to 
developed markets and so it may be useful to consider first week or first month returns, 
although they are rarely used as measures of underpricing in the literature. To calculate 
the underpricing level based on first week or first month returns, the same methodologies 
as defined above are used.         
 
 
                                                 
28
 To cater for this anomaly, it would be most appropriate to construct a portfolio having the same risk as 
the IPO. As such, some studies (e.g., Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995) consider initial returns which 
are adjusted by taking into account the returns of matching firms. However, matching adjustment methods 
are rarely used, probably because it is time consuming and difficult to find matching firms unless there is a 
very large sample available to the researcher. Indeed, the sample size is significantly limited for the 
Mauritian market. Therefore, the 1iMAAR  will be used as an adjustment to the raw underpricing measure. 
This is also consistent with the existing literature whereby most studies prefer to use the market adjusted 
returns. 
29
 Reilly and Hatfield (1969), McDonald & Fisher (1972), and Beatty and Ritter (1986). 
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4.3 Explaining the Short-run Underpricing of IPOs: The Regression Model 
To explain the factors accounting for the short run underpricing of IPOs, two measures 
are used as the dependent variable: the simple raw initial returns and the market-adjusted 
initial returns of IPOs that went public from 1989 until 2005. The explanatory variables, 
based on the literature discussed above, include proxies for the ex ante uncertainty of the 
firm, signalling mechanisms and underwriter reputation. The multiple regressions 
employed are 
iiiii
iiiiiiit
uAUDITREPBROKREPSEOEPS
ZSCORERISKFINLEVAGESIZEROAR


10987
654321


  (6)
 
iiiiii
iiiiiit
uAUDITREPBROKREPSEOEPSZSCORE
RISKFINLEVAGESIZEROAMAAR

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109876
54321


  
(7) 
where
1i
R  and 1iMAAR  are the first day raw and excess return (as defined above) 
corresponding to the issue by firm i respectively. A description of the independent 
variables used as well as the expected relationships is summarized in Table 1.    
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
4.4 The Financial Strength of IPOs and the Altman Z-score Model  
According to Gasbarro et al. (2003), the financial strength of IPOs can be proxied using 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score model, which was initially used to predict the survival rates of 
public companies. To the authors’ knowledge, there has not been any comprehensive 
application of the Z-score model to estimate the ex ante financial strength of IPOs. 
Altman (2000) argues that, “… the most frequent inquiry that I have received from those 
interested in using the Z-Score model is, ‘What should we do to apply the model to firms 
in the private sector?’”. To this effect, Altman (2000) undertakes a re-estimation of the 
original Z-score model.
30
 In this model, the book value of equity is replaced by the 
market value of equity. As such, based on Altman’s bankruptcy model, the financial 
strength of IPOs is measured as 
 iiiiii XXXXXZ 54321 998.0420.0107.3847.0717.0     (8) 
                                                 
30
 Altman (2000) suggests a complete re-estimation of the model “….rather than simply inserting a proxy 
variable into an existing model to calculate Z-scores”. 
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where iZ  proxies the financial strength of firm i and X1i, X2i, X3i, X4i and X5i measure the 
liquidity, profitability, productivity of assets, leverage and income generating ability of 
the firm respectively. In particular, firms will be partitioned into two categories, high and 
low financial health groups, based on the Z-scores. Following Altman (2000), those firms 
having of a score less than 1.23 will be considered to be in the low financial health group. 
 
5. Analysis and Findings 
5.1 Aggregate Underpricing 
The section examines whether an investor who bought all IPOs from when the SEM was 
set up until 2005 at the offer price and sold them on the first day, first week or first month 
of their listing, earned a significant abnormal return. In particular, a fixed amount of 
money is assumed to be invested in every IPO. As such, the null hypothesis entails that 
the average raw or abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. Table 2 
reports the average first day, first week and first months returns for the 44 IPOs during 
the period 1989 to 2005. It is observed that the average raw (unadjusted) initial return is 
14.29%, while the average market index-adjusted initial return is 13.14%. In addition, an 
investor can earn at least an additional average return of 3% if the IPOs are held either 
until their first week or first month of listing. The average returns are the highest if the 
investor buys and holds every IPO until the end of their first month. However, one must 
also note that risks are the highest for first month returns relative to the first day or first 
week returns.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
As the distribution of the first day, first week and first month returns are not symmetric,
31
 
a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic
32
 is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
significant average return. The results show that in all cases, the returns are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that Mauritian IPOs are on average underpriced. 
This evidence is consistent with that for almost all IPO markets in different countries. In 
particular, it is found that the level of underpricing on the SEM is consistent with findings 
                                                 
31
 The mean being greater than the median in all cases, implying that the returns are positively skewed. 
32
 The bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic is developed by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). Rajesh 
Tharyan and Scott Merryman from Centre for Finance and Investment, University of Exeter, UK provided 
the programme code in Stata to compute the skewness adjusted t-statistic. 
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for countries such as the U.S, U.K, Australia, and Germany, where the degree of 
underpricing is found to be in the range 10-20%.
33
 However, the extent of average 
underpricing is much smaller when compared to some major South-East Asian markets 
such as Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, Singapore or Japan,
34
 where an average underpricing 
level of least 30% is reported. Compared to the African markets, Mauritian IPOs 
generally experience a higher degree of average underpricing, as Alli et al. (2010) and 
Omran (2002) report an average first day return of 7.08% and 8.4% on the South-African 
and Egyptian markets respectively.  
 
From Table 2, one can note that the average first day return is around 14%.  Also, most of 
the price reactions are likely to occur during the first days of trading given that the initial 
first day market adjusted return is approximately 13%, while the first week and first 
month underpricings do not exceed 17%.  This is in line with Aggarwal et al. (1993), 
where an underpricing level of 78.5% is observed for the Brazilian market on the first day 
of trading while monthly underpricing (including the first day) is 90.2%.   
 
Although there may be positive average initial returns on the Mauritian IPO market, there 
is a wide variation across the individual issues. None of these IPOs suffer from negative 
initial returns and one in four IPOs closes on the first day at the offer price. The 
probability of an IPO closing at the offer price is relatively higher in the Mauritian 
market considering that Ritter (1998) reports that one in six IPOs terminates at the offer 
price on the US market. In addition, a limited number of companies (only eight out of 44) 
on the Mauritian market have exceeded a return of 20% on their first day. In fact, there 
are only two IPOs which have managed to earn a return of greater than 50%. Overall, 
eight out of ten IPOs on the Mauritian market have a return between 0 and 20% on their 
first day.   
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 Ritter and Welch (2002) for the US markets, Levis (1993) for the UK market, and Ljungqvist (1993) for 
the German Market. 
34
 Isa & Yong (2003) for the Malaysian market, Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1995) for the Korean Market, 
Dawson (1987) for the Singaporean market, and Hibara and Mathew (2004) for the Japanese market. 
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5.2 The Size Effect and Average Underpricing 
To analyze the effect of the firm’s size on the initial returns of the companies on the 
SEM, the sample is divided according to the median market capitalisation of the firm. In 
line with the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis where small firms are subject to more ex ante 
uncertainty, Table 3 shows that average unadjusted and market adjusted initial returns are 
higher for smaller companies and lower for larger companies. However, the Wilcoxon 
test shows that the difference in the underpricing between large and small firms is 
statistically insignificant. In effect, when the sample is segregated into quartiles, there are 
no discernible patterns between the market capitalization and the level of underpricing. 
Hence, on the basis of those results, the size of the company going public on the SEM is 
not related to the return obtained by the investor on the IPO.  This result is inconsistent 
with the findings of Ritter (1991), Barry et al. (1991) and Clarkson and Merkley (1994) 
amongst others. However, this result may be supported by the fact that the large firms in 
this sample are not really large by international standards.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
5.3 Motives for Going Public and Average Underpricing 
To reflect the issuers’ motives for going public, the sample is divided into two categories 
by offer type. In the Mauritian context, as per the listing rules of the SEM, it is only when 
firms go public through an “offer for subscription” that new shares are issued and sold to 
the public, whereas other methods of listing such as “introduction”, “offer for sale” or 
“placings” do not involve any issue of new securities. As such, in Table 4, the NEW 
category includes 14 firms issuing new shares only while 30 firms in the OLD category 
offer old shares. In particular, firms normally issue new shares as a means to fund capital 
projects. However, since the inception of the SEM, a relatively low proportion of firms 
have gone public with the primary motive of raising capital. In the Mauritian context, this 
can be explained by the fact that firms were mainly attracted to the tax reductions from 
35% to 25% which were provided to listed companies by the government in the early 
1990s as an incentive to boost the local stock exchange. Also, firms were keen to list as 
the stock exchange provided opportunities for existing shareholders to increase the 
marketability of their shares.  
 
 17 
As documented by Kim et al. (1993), if firms need funds for projects, there will be more 
pressure on the IPO proceeds, leading to a lesser degree of underpricing. As expected, the 
initial performance of the NEW group, 15.05%, is higher than the OLD category, 
12.24%. However, a test for the difference of performance between the two groups is 
statistically insignificant. As such, the results confirm that, on the SEM, the degree of 
underpricing does not depend on the motives of the firm going public.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
 
5.4 Stock Broker Reputation, Auditor Reputation and Average Underpricing 
According to Carter and Manaster (1990), high quality underwriters are, on average, 
associated with IPOs which have a lower degree of underpricing. In order to test this 
hypothesis, two proxies are used, namely the stockbroker’s reputation and the auditor’s 
reputation. In the finance literature, prior studies
35
 have traditionally focused on firm size 
as a proxy for measuring quality.
36
 DeAngelo (1981) argues that the rationale for this 
standard is that larger audit firms supply higher quality since they stand to lose more than 
smaller firms in terms of reputation. In this respect, stockbroker reputation is measured 
taking into account the number of IPOs which have been sponsored by respective 
stockbrokers while the measure of auditor reputation takes into account the proportion of 
the total number of IPOs which have been audited by that firm. The sample is initially 
partitioned into two groups on the basis of stockbroker and auditor quality (HIGH and 
LOW). In particular, firms are grouped in the high category if they are sponsored by 
either MCB or CIM Stockbroker Ltd since these two stockbroking companies capture 
more than 55% of the IPO market. Similarly, firms which are audited by DCDM are 
grouped in the high category as DCDM audits more than 55% of listed firms on the 
official market of the SEM. From Table 5, 29 and 25 out of 44 offerings are brought to 
the market by high quality stockbrokers and auditors respectively.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
 
With regards to stockbroker reputation, Table 5 shows that the average values for the 
initial unadjusted price run-up are higher, as expected, if issues are sponsored by low 
                                                 
35
 Becker et al. (1998), DeAngelo (1981), Francis and Wilson (1988) and Krishnan and Schauer (2000). 
36
 However, Beatty (1989) argues that the classification of a firm’s size may be insufficient for capturing 
variations in audit quality. 
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quality stockbroking companies. However, when returns are market-adjusted, this result 
is insignificant. Moreover, a test for the difference of performance between the HIGH 
and LOW stockbroker groups is statistically insignificant. Based on these results, the 
degree of underpricing is not related to the reputation of stockbrokers on the SEM. As far 
as the auditor’s reputation is concerned, Table 5 indicates that the average initial price 
run-ups are positively related to the quality of the auditor. The mean of the initial market 
adjusted returns is 15.09% for HIGH quality auditors and 10.57% for LOW quality 
auditors. Also, the average unadjusted and adjusted initial returns of IPOs in the HIGH 
audit category are higher than the underpricing level of IPOs in the LOW audit category. 
The Wilcoxon test shows that the difference in the underpricing is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. In effect, one would expect that a higher auditor’s reputation will be 
associated with lower ex ante uncertainty so that such firms should exhibit a lower degree 
of underpricing. This result is confirms the significance of the signalling effect of 
auditor’s quality in the Mauritian market. In particular, the value of the IPO seems to be 
an increasing function of the auditor’s quality such that the appointment of higher quality 
auditors contributes to higher underpricing. 
 
Measuring stockbroker and auditor reputation is somewhat tricky in Mauritius since the 
market is completely dominated by two firms that capture over half of the market share. 
Those big firms are mainly the local pioneering financial services providers and have 
build a solid reputation over the years such that there are less uncertainty surrounding 
their future. In this respect, the context of Mauritian market quite unique given the 
smallness of the market and the monopolistic nature of its financial services industry. In 
effect, to test the validity of the reputation measure, the auditing and stock broking firms 
were also ranked in terms of their turnover and age. The results are consistent with our 
earlier predictions in that those firms with the highest turnover and age also fall within 
the highest reputation category. As such, we consider the number of IPOs sponsored or 
audited as a reasonable proxy for the stock brokering or auditing firms’ reputation. This 
measure has also been adopted by a number of existing studies
37
 in the literature. 
                                                 
37
 Francis and Wilson (1988), Becker et al. (1998), Jelic et al. (2001), Krishnan and Schauer (2000) and 
Bulut et al. (2009) 
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5.5 Financial Strength and Average Underpricing 
Table 6 presents information on the relationship between the financial strength and the 
level of underpricing. In particular, financial strength is proxied by the Altman (2000) Z-
score. The sample is partitioned into HIGH and LOW financial strength groups. Firms 
having a score less than 1.23 are placed in the LOW financial health group. From Table 
6, the results show that there are slightly more firms in the HIGH financial group. Also, 
the average underpricing is higher for firms in the HIGH strength group than firms with 
lower financial strength. In addition, the Wilcoxon test shows that the difference in 
underpricing is statistically significant at the 5% level. The results are consistent with the 
ex ante uncertainty hypothesis
38
 but inconsistent with the predictions of signalling 
theories as supported by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Welch (1989) and Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989).  
[INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
While the Z-score is probably the most reliable and well respected composite measure of 
financial strength, in order to investigate its robustness, we also employ another proxy 
based on aftermarket information. In particular, based on the a number of previous 
studies,
39
 the return to risk ratio is used and is calculated as the average monthly return 
during the first three years of listing divided by the standard deviation of post IPO 
returns. The results show that higher financial strength is associated with lower average 
underpricing, consistent with when the Altman Z-scores are used as proxies for financial 
strength. In addition, through further analysis, companies with lower Z-scores seem on 
average to have lower return to risk ratios and vice-versa. To this effect, the Z-score 
model based on financial statement information seems to be consistent with the risk-
return partition which is based on market returns.     
 
5.6 Short-Run Aftermarket Performance and Average Underpricing 
Table 7 presents the initial and short-term returns for the sample of IPOs listed on the 
SEM. On average, the investor earns a return of 13.14% if the stock is bought at the offer 
                                                 
38
 Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Ritter (1991), Garfinkel (1993), Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), 
and Ljungqvist (2006), amongst others. 
39
 Ritter (1991), Carter and Manaster (1990). 
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price and sold thereafter on the secondary market on the first listing date of the IPO. 
However, for those buying IPOs in the aftermarket, the opportunity to earn a similar 
average return is not available as the highest average abnormal returns after the first day 
of trading do not exceed 3.67%. In fact, after the fourth day of trading, the average initial 
abnormal return turns negative. As such, for the overall sample, the observed initial 
abnormal day-to-day returns are positive but dissipate beyond the first four days of 
trading. This finding is consistent with results for the South African market where Alli et 
al. (2010) claim that “the opportunity for an abnormal return is only available to those 
investors able to buy the offering at the offer price and not to those buying these stocks in 
the aftermarket.”  
[INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE] 
 
Considering the initial returns by industry segment, IPOs in the Commerce sector seem to 
benefit from positive average abnormal returns during six out of seven days after the 
listing event. However, the initial average market adjusted return is positive and highest 
on the listing date, but fall after the first few days of trading. This finding also seems 
consistent when controlling for market size, offer size, offer type, stockbroker reputation, 
auditor reputation and financial strength.  
 
5.7 Underpricing Regression Analysis and Empirical Results 
In this section, several cross-sectional regressions are estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to assess the factors affecting short-run underpricing. In particular, the 
dependent variable is level of underpricing based on two proxies, namely the initial raw 
returns and the market-adjusted initial returns.
40
 The explanatory variables are proxies 
based on the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis, the signalling hypothesis and the underwriter 
reputation hypothesis. The regression results to explain the short-run initial raw returns 
are presented in Table 8. There is no serious multicollinearity among any of the 
explanatory variables and heteroscedasticity in the residuals is accounted for by adjusting 
the standard errors using the procedure of White (1980).  
 
                                                 
40
 However, only the results from the regressions using the market-adjusted returns are presented to avoid 
repetition. The findings are qualitatively identical.   
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Despite that we include all IPOs on the Mauritian market since its inception, the sample 
size is necessarily small. Therefore, in order to ensure that our inferences are as robust as 
possible and to account for the impact that non-normality of the residuals may have at 
such sample sizes, we implement a bootstrap procedure to construct p-values for each 
parameter in a fashion that does not require the normality assumption. Specifically, the 
bootstrap approach that we adopt is conducted as follows. For all models estimated, we 
collect the residuals and produce 10,000 bootstrapped samples each of the same size as 
the original sample (44 observations). For each of these replications, we reconstruct the 
dependent variable by adding the resampled residuals to the original regression fitted 
values to obtain a set of bootstrapped observations on the dependent variable. We then 
rerun the regression for each of these 10,000 replications and collect the t-ratios for each 
parameter estimated. We can then compare the actual t-ratios with these simulated 
distributions to obtain a bootstrapped p-value for each parameter that can be examined 
alongside the conventionally calculated p-values. This approach is adopted for all of the 
regressions that we conduct in this study. 
 
The first regression model in Table 8 tests for the relevance of the ex ante hypothesis to 
explain the short-run underpricing of IPOs. Model 1 shows that, among several proxies 
for the ex ante uncertainty of IPOs, the aftermarket risk level and the ex ante financial 
strength are the only variables which are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. In effect, the results confirm a positive and marginally significant 
relationship between underpricing and the aftermarket risk level. In addition, the results 
show that firms will on average underprice less if they are financially stronger. Neither is 
significant according to the bootstrapped p-values for the “large” models including all ten 
explanatory variances, although they are significant in model 5. These results are 
consistent with the predictions of previous studies,
41
 and confirm that the greater is the ex 
ante uncertainty of the issue, the greater is the expected underpricing.  However, other 
variables such as the return on assets, age, size of the offering and financial leverage, 
acting as proxies for the ex ante uncertainty of the issue, are statistically insignificant in 
the Mauritian market.  In this respect, it must be highlighted that none of the accounting 
                                                 
41
 Beatty and Ritter (1986), Aussenegg (2003), and Lowry et al. (2010), amongst others.  
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variables tested can be considered good proxies for ex ante uncertainty. However, the 
Altman Z-score, taking into account several aspects of the financial statements, seems to 
reflect investors’ perceptions regarding the ex ante uncertainty of the firm.   
[INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE] 
On the other hand, model 2 shows limited support for signalling theories on the SEM as 
firms having higher profitability ratios and exercising seasoned offerings do not on 
average experience higher underpricing.
42
 In addition, there is a significant (at the 10% 
level according to the standard and bootstrapped p-values) and negative relationship 
between the ex ante financial strength and the level of underpricing suggesting that the ex 
ante uncertainty effect of this variable dominates the signalling effect. In particular, the 
high Z-score is viewed by the market as a proxy surrounding the uncertainty of the issue 
rather than as a proxy for the quality of the issue such that the negative relationship is 
consistent with the ex ante hypothesis.  
 
With regard to model 3, two proxies – stockbroker reputation and auditors’ reputation – 
are used to test the underwriter reputation hypothesis. The results suggest that there is no 
significant relation between stockbroker reputation and the level of underpricing. 
However, there is a positive and significant relationship between the auditor’s reputation 
and the initial raw returns for both the conventional and bootstrapped p-values. In 
particular, IPOs which are audited by a well known and prestigious auditing company 
will on average exhibit a higher level of underpricing. This result, though significant, is 
inconsistent with the expected predictions of the underwriter reputation hypothesis as one 
expects a negative rather than a positive relationship to prevail.
43
  Hence the signalling 
role of audit quality seems to dominate the Mauritian market. In effect, one may claim 
that the better the auditing firm, the better the perceived quality of the company such that 
there is a higher aftermarket demand for the IPO, leading to a higher aftermarket price. 
This seems consistent with the signalling theories of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989), where firms which are more likely to be 
underpriced. 
                                                 
42
  The results are consistent with the findings of James (1992), and Michaely and Shaw (1994), who find 
no support for the signalling hypothesis. 
43
Balvers et. al. (1988), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Kim et al. (1993). 
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Model 4 considers all explanatory variables from all hypotheses. As one can observe, the 
risk level, the financial strength and the auditor’s reputation are the only variables which 
are statistically significant in explaining the initial raw returns, although neither are 
significant according to the bootstrapped p-values in this particular specification as this 
model is probably overparameterised given the modest sample size. This result is 
consistent with model 5, which is obtained after successive variable deletion tests, 
removing the insignificant variables, but now the Z-score variable is highly significant 
and the risk variable is almost significant even with the bootstrap-constructed p-values. 
Overall, firms with a higher aftermarket risk level, lower financial strength and higher 
auditing firm reputation will on average exhibit a higher degree of underpricing.   
 
5.8 Multiple Regressions to Explain the Short Run Performance of IPOs 
According to Mok and Hui (1998), the level of underpricing is likely to be greater 
following longer gaps between the application closing date and the first day trading. As 
such, some studies
44
 prefer to use the first week’s or first month’s returns as measures of 
underpricing.  Therefore, the first day underpricing calculations are now extended to the 
first week and the first month returns. In particular, the dependent variable measures the 
short run performance of IPOs taking into account the first week raw and market adjusted 
returns as well the first month raw and market adjusted returns. The results from Table 9 
are consistent with the above findings in that the risk level of the issue and the auditor’s 
reputation are statistically significant when the first week and first month returns (both 
adjusted and un-adjusted) are used. When we consider the bootstrap p-values, this result 
only applies when the reduced form model including only three or four explanatory 
variables is used due to the insufficient number of degrees of freedom from the full 
specification. However, the financial strength variable is only significant when 
underpricing calculations are extended to first week returns. In general, among the eight 
regression models used in Table 9, there seems to be strong support for firms with a 
higher aftermarket risk level and higher auditing firm reputation to on average exhibit a 
higher degree of underpricing.   
[INSERT TABLE 9 AROUND HERE] 
                                                 
44
 Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993) and Pauydal, Saadouni and Briston (1998) amongst others. 
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6. Conclusions  
Taking into account all firms which have gone public on the official market of the Stock 
Exchange of Mauritius for the period 1989 until 2010, this study examines the evidence 
on the short-run underpricing of IPOs. In particular, an average underpricing level within 
the range 10 to 20% is found based on first day, first week and first month returns. When 
considering the short-run aftermarket performance and average underpricing, the investor 
earns an average initial return of 13.14%. However, after the fourth day of trading, the 
average initial abnormal return turns negative. Using a regression approach, the degree of 
underpricing is explained by the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and the underwriter 
reputation hypothesis. However, there is limited support for the signalling hypothesis. In 
particular, the results show that the aftermarket risk level and auditor’s reputation both 
have a significant positive impact on the initial returns while the ex ante financial 
strength (based on the Altman Z-score) has a significant negative effect on short-run 
underpricing. Firms with a higher aftermarket risk level, weaker financial strength and 
stronger auditing firm reputation will on average exhibit a higher degree of underpricing. 
However, the results show that there is no statistically significant relationship with other 
explanatory factors such as return on assets, offer size, age, earnings per share, seasoned 
equity offerings, stockbroker reputation and the level of underpricing. 
 
The results obtained from this study show that new issues on the SEM are subject to 
underpricing, consistent with developed and other emerging markets. In this respect, 
prospective investors should pursue the strategy of buying the new issues at the offer and 
selling them immediately on the first day of trading. However, the study also reveals that 
investors should not hold new issues very long as the highest component of the initial 
returns is found on the first day of trading and that the average initial returns turn 
negative on the fourth day of trading.     
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION AND COMPUTATION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES USED IN 
THE STUDY OF SHORT-RUN UNDERPRICING 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
EXPECTED 
SIGN 
DESCRIPTIONS CALCULATION 
ROA = rate of return 
on total assets 
-VE A high return on assets is synonymous 
with high profitability which alleviates 
investors concerns and reduces 
uncertainties such that lower average 
underpricing is expected. 
The net income before the IPO divided by 
total assets before listing. 
SIZE = issue proceeds 
 
-VE Smaller offerings tend to be more 
speculative than larger offerings and as 
such exhibit greater underpricing. 
The log of firm i’s offering size computed 
as the total number of shares issued at the 
offering times the offering price. 
AGE = age of the firm -VE Older firms have lower ex-ante 
uncertainty compared to younger firms 
and as such are expected to be subject to 
lower underpricing. 
The logarithm of one plus the company’s 
age in years, where age is calculated from 
the year of incorporation to the year of 
listing. 
FINLEV = Financial 
Leverage 
+VE Financial leverage is used as a proxy for 
the risks of the firm. Greater risks are 
linked to greater underpricing. 
The book value of pre-IPO debt (short term 
and long term) divided by the book value of 
all assets. 
RISK= Aftermarket 
risk level of the IPO 
+VE The more the price of the new company is 
uncertain, the more discount an issuer 
will offer in selling the IPO. 
Risk is defined as the Standard Deviation 
(SD) of the returns after the listing of the 
IPO over next thirty days. 
ZSCORE = Ex-ante 
Financial Strength 
-VE IPOs with high financial strength should 
be associated with lower underpricing due 
to their lower ex-ante uncertainty. 
An Altman Z-score is calculated based on 
figures prior to the year of listing to proxy 
the ex-ante financial strength. 
EPS = Earnings Per 
Share 
+VE There will be a large investor demand for 
issues that have higher earnings per share 
as this sends positive signals to the 
market on the firm’s profitability. 
Earnings per share are measured for the 
most recent twelve months in the year prior 
to going public. 
SEO = Seasoned 
Equity Offerings 
+VE A higher price at a seasoned offering 
(SEO) eventually compensates firms for 
the intentionally low IPO price as firms 
exercise patience to time their seasoned 
offerings. 
A binary variable where a value of one 
indicates the firm issues a SEO with the 
definition being broadened to right issues. 
BROKREP = Stock 
broker’s reputation  
-VE Prestigious underwriters are associated 
with a lower degree of underpricing since 
they eliminate some uncertainties and 
signal some favourable private 
information. 
Sponsoring stockbroker reputation is 
proxied by the number of issues the 
stockbroker has sponsored. A dummy 
variable is then used where a value of one 
indicates that the firm has been sponsored 
by a highly prestigious stock broker.  
AUDITREP = 
Auditor’s Reputation 
-VE The uncertainty surrounding the firm will 
go down as reputation increases. In 
particular, high quality audit firms will be 
associated with lower underpricing. 
Auditor’s reputation is calculated by taking 
the ratio of the number of IPOs audited to 
the total number of IPOs during the sample 
period. A dummy variable is then used 
where a value of one indicates that the firm 
has been audited by a highly quality auditor. 
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 TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON AGGREGATE UNDERPRICING 
Descriptive Statistics for unadjusted and market adjusted measures of underpricing for 44 Mauritian newly 
listed companies from 1989 to 2005. Given that all the returns are skewed (mean being greater than the 
median), we use the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics developed by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999).  
  
(N=44) MIN MAX MEAN t-Statistic P-Value MEDIAN STD.DEV 
First day returns (%)        
INITIAL RAW 
RETURNS 0.00 108.33 14.29 5.63 0.00 9.08 22.60 
MARKET ADJUSTED  
RETURNS -1.79 103.77 13.14 6.40 0.00 6.92 22.39 
 
First week returns (%)        
INITIAL RAW 
RETURNS -2.94 113.00 17.70 7.06 0.00 10.00 22.95 
MARKET ADJUSTED  
RETURNS -2.59 112.12 16.32 7.18 0.00 9.23 22.19 
 
First month returns (%)        
INITIALRAW  
RETURNS -17.17 149.00 20.62 6.15 0.00 16.46 29.25 
MARKET ADJUSTED  
RETURNS -22.36 144.97 16.50 5.33 0.00 7.76 28.66 
 
TABLE 3: SIZE EFFECT AND AVERAGE UNDERPRICING  
Distribution of market adjusted first day underpricing for 44 Mauritian newly listed companies from 1989 
to 2005 based on their market capitalization. We used Rs 125 million, Rs 240 million and Rs 700 million as 
cut-offs as they are close to the first, median and third quartile values respectively. However, given the 
small sample size, firms are also partitioned (separately) into two groups (small and large) based on their 
market capitalization.  The small group pertains to firms whose market capitalization values are less than 
Rs 240 million. 
Market Capitalization Number 
of IPOs 
Average First day Raw 
Underpricing (%) 
Average First day Market 
adjusted Underpricing (%) 
< Rs 125 M 11 14.77 12.56 
Rs 126 M-Rs 240 M 11 15.32 15.09 
Rs 241 M- Rs 700 M 11 9.96 8.50 
> Rs 700 M 11 16.63 15.80 
Small 22 15.74 14.51 
Large 22 12.85 11.76 
Wilcoxon Z-Value 
(P-values in parentheses) 
-0.958 
(0.338) 
-0.406 
(0.685) 
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TABLE 4: OFFER TYPE AND AVERAGE UNDERPRICING  
Distribution of market adjusted first day underpricing for 44 Mauritian newly listed companies from 1989 
to 2005 based on their types of offer. The NEW category stands for all firms which have issued new shares 
in the IPO market while the OLD category represents instances where no new shares are created.    
UNDERPRICING 
BY OFFER TYPE 
Number of IPOs Average First day Raw 
Underpricing (%) 
Average First day Market 
adjusted Underpricing (%) 
NEW 14 15.61 15.05 
OLD 30 13.68 12.24 
ALL 44 14.29 13.14 
Wilcoxon Z-Value 
(P-values in parentheses) 
-0.419 
(0.675) 
-0.973 
(0.331) 
 
TABLE 5: STOCKBROKER REPUTATION, AUDITOR REPUTATION AND AVERAGE 
UNDERPRICING  
Distribution of market adjusted first day underpricing for 44 Mauritian newly listed companies from 1989 
to 2005 based on the stockbroker and auditor reputation.  The sample is partitioned into two groups on the 
basis of stockbroker quality and auditor quality (HIGH and LOW). The Stockbroker’s reputation is proxied 
by the number of issues which have been sponsored while the auditor’s reputation is proxied by the number 
of listed firms which have been audited.  
UNDERPRICING BY STOCKBROKING COMPANIES REPUTATION 
QUALITY Number of IPOs Average First day 
Raw Underpricing 
(%) 
Average First day 
Market adjusted 
Underpricing (%) 
HIGH 29 13.83 13.32 
LOW 15 15.20 12.78 
Wilcoxon Z-Value 
(P-values in parentheses) 
-0.345 
(0.730) 
-1.079 
(0.281) 
UNDERPRICING BY AUDITOR REPUTATION 
QUALITY Number of IPOs Average First day 
Raw Underpricing 
(%) 
Average First day 
Market adjusted 
Underpricing (%) 
HIGH 25 15.88 15.09 
LOW 19 12.21 10.57 
Wilcoxon Z-Value 
(P-values in parentheses) 
2.093 
(0.036) 
1.932 
(0.053) 
 
TABLE 6: FINANCIAL STRENGTH AND AVERAGE UNDERPRICING  
Distribution of market adjusted first day underpricing for 44 Mauritian newly listed companies from 1989 
to 2005 based on their financial strength proxied by the ALTMAN Z-score model. Based on Altman 
(2000), those firms having of a score less than 1.23 will be placed in the LOW financial health group. With 
regards to the return to risk ratio, the median value is used to partition firms into the high and low financial 
strength group.  
 UNDERPRICING BY FINANCIAL STRENGTH- Altman Z Score 
FINANCIAL 
STRENGTH 
Number of IPOs Average First day Raw 
Underpricing (%) 
Average First day Market 
adjusted Underpricing (%) 
HIGH 26 9.85 9.21 
LOW 18 17.37 15.86 
Wilcoxon Z-Value (p-values in parentheses) -3.193 (0.016) -2.032 (0.043) 
UNDERPRICING BY FINANCIAL STRENGTH- Return to Risk 
FINANCIAL 
STRENGTH 
Number of IPOs Average First day Raw 
Underpricing (%) 
Average First day Market 
adjusted Underpricing (%) 
HIGH 22 9.26 8.09 
LOW 22 19.32 18.18 
Wilcoxon Z-Value (p-values in parentheses) -2.763 (0.006) -2.497 (0.013) 
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TABLE 7: INITIAL AND IMMEDIATE MARKET AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS 
The table below shows the initial and aftermarket returns on a daily basis over the 7-day window following 
the date of initial quotation on the exchange. 
 Number 
of firms 
Initial 
Market 
Adjusted 
Average 
Return 
(%) 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
ALL FIRMS 44 13.14 3.67 1.02 1.19 0.02 -1.01 -0.78 -0.40 
SEGMENTATION BY INDUSTRY 
BANKS AND 
INSURANCE 8 9.17 2.87 0.35 -1.76 -0.83 -2.67 -2.14 -0.67 
COMMERCE 7 17.59 2.14 2.87 6.48 0.96 -0.13 0.86 0.80 
HOTELS AND 
LEISURE 5 10.77 2.60 -1.91 -2.37 -0.89 -1.81 -1.38 -0.42 
INDUSTRY 7 12.97 4.49 0.73 -0.73 -1.31 -1.64 0.99 1.15 
INVESTMENT 11 17.98 4.17 0.62 2.01 1.04 -1.07 -1.79 -0.45 
SUGAR 5 4.12 3.09 1.03 0.63 -0.57 1.50 -0.06 -3.38 
TRANSPORT 1 17.71 5.97 6.00 2.44 -3.06 -3.35 -0.39 0.84 
SEGMENTATION BY MARKET CAPITALISATION 
SMALL 22 14.51 4.82 1.71 2.32 -0.01 -1.02 -0.70 -0.90 
LARGE 22 11.76 2.02 0.00 -0.39 -0.40 -1.27 -0.67 0.21 
SEGMENTATION BY GROSS PROCEEDS 
SMALL 22 15.87 3.34 0.84 0.18 -0.59 -0.17 -0.18 -1.04 
LARGE 22 10.41 3.43 0.83 1.72 0.19 -2.17 -1.22 0.40 
SEGMENTATION BY OFFER TYPE 
NEW 14 15.05 1.34 0.02 -0.12 -0.20 -1.25 -0.34 0.43 
OLD 30 12.24 4.27 1.19 1.39 -0.22 -1.10 -0.84 -0.66 
SEGMENTATION BY STOCKBORKER REPUTATION 
HIGH 29 13.32 3.07 0.86 1.29 -0.20 -1.12 -1.18 -0.01 
LOW 15 12.78 3.97 0.79 0.27 -0.24 -1.20 0.23 -0.94 
SEGMENTATION BY AUDITOR REPUTATION 
HIGH 25 15.09 4.51 2.03 2.98 0.30 -0.60 -1.15 -0.95 
LOW 19 10.57 1.96 -0.67 -1.65 -0.86 -1.84 -0.10 0.45 
SEGMENTATION BY FINANCIAL STRENGTH 
HIGH 26 9.21 3.86 1.16 1.62 -0.41 -1.33 0.07 0.20 
LOW 18 15.86 2.73 0.38 -0.02 0.07 -0.90 -1.74 -1.08 
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TABLE 8: Multiple Regression to Explain the Short Run Market Adjusted Underpricing of IPOs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables Ex-ante 
uncertainty 
hypothesis 
Signalling 
hypothesis 
Underwriter 
reputation 
hypothesis 
All Variables Final Model 
Intercept 0.2482 0.1514 0.0497 0.0545 -0.0950 
p-value 0.5662 0.0016*** 0.2552 0.9710 0.2243 
boot p-value 0.6178 0.0302** 0.4260 0.4913 0.2844 
ROA -0.6146   -0.3611  
p-value 0.3162   0.7151  
boot p-value 0.4915   0.4996  
SIZE -0.0108   0.0062  
p-value 0.8021   0.7503  
boot p-value 0.4487   0.5912  
AGE -0.1953   -0.1613  
p-value 0.0737*   0.1563  
boot p-value 0.2615   0.2402  
FINLEV -0.0007   -0.0007  
p-value 0.6702   0.2981  
boot p-value 0.4474   0.4739  
RISK 10.8704   9.2606 6.4956 
p-value 0.0442**   0.0433** 0.0691* 
boot p-value 0.8501   0.8645 0.1396 
ZSCORE -0.0086 -0.0032  -0.0067 -0.0040 
p-value 0.0050*** 0.0656*  0.0017*** 0.0058*** 
boot p-value 0.2133 0.0812*  0.2145 0.0127** 
EPS  -0.0103  -0.0014  
p-value  0.2627  0.5450  
boot p-value  0.1952  0.4495  
SEO  0.0536  -0.0591  
p-value  0.5371  0.7538  
boot p-value  0.6668  0.4856  
BROKREP    -0.0203 -0.0374  
p-value   0.7814 0.5402  
boot p-value   0.4501 0.4539  
AUDITREP   0.1672 0.1481 0.1245 
p-value   0.0046*** 0.0265** 0.0037*** 
boot p-value   0.0134** 0.6491 0.0148** 
Adjusted R2 0.2069 0.0310 0.0950 0.2690 0.1665 
F-VALUE 2.6086 0.4267 3.2576 2.2375 3.8631 
Prob.(F) 0.0365** 0.7350 0.0486** 0.0448** 0.0162** 
White’s test p-value  (1980) 0.0249** 0.9633 0.1958 0.0826* 0.0591* 
 
The sample period takes into account 44 IPOs from 1989 until 2005. The dependent variable is the initial market 
adjusted return of companies and the independent variables are defined as follows: ROA=rate of return on total assets, 
SIZE=issue proceeds, AGE= age of the firm, FINLEV=Financial Leverage, RISK= Aftermarket risk level of the IPO, 
ZSCORE= Altman’s Z-score prior to listing, EPS= Earnings Per Share, SEO=Seasoned Equity Offerings, BROKREP= 
Stock broker’s reputation and AUDITREP= Auditor’s Reputation. Several specifications of the regression model are 
used based on the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis, the signalling hypothesis and the underwriter reputation hypothesis. 
White’s (1980) adjusted student t-statistics are used where appropriate and conventional p-values are reported below 
each estimate followed by bootstrap-generated p-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. 
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TABLE 9: Multiple Regression to Explain the Short Run Performance of IPOs 
The sample period takes into account 44 IPOs from 1989 until 2005. The dependent variable is the short run performance of IPOs. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: ROA=rate of return on total assets, SIZE=issue proceeds, AGE= age of the 
firm, FINLEV=Financial Leverage, RISK= Aftermarket risk level of the IPO, ZSCORE= Altman’s Z-score prior to listing, EPS= 
Earnings Per Share, SEO=Seasoned Equity Offerings, BROKREP= Stock broker’s reputation and AUDITREP= Auditor’s 
Reputation. White’s (1980) adjusted student t-statistics are used where appropriate and conventional p-values are reported below 
each estimate followed by bootstrap-adjusted p-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Dependent Variable First Week 
Returns 
First 
Month 
Returns 
First 
Week 
Market 
Adjusted 
Returns 
First 
Month 
Market  
Adjusted 
Returns 
First 
Week 
Returns 
First 
Month 
Returns 
First 
Week 
Market 
Adjusted 
Returns 
First 
Month 
Market 
Adjusted 
Returns 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent 
Variables 
All Variables All 
Variables 
All 
Variables 
All 
Variables 
Final 
Model 
Final 
Model 
Final 
Model 
Final 
Model 
Intercept -0.0181 0.4252 0.1280 0.6031 -0.1179 -0.1072 -0.0964 -0.0817 
p-value 0.9692 0.3531 0.7586 0.1492 0.0682* 0.2164 0.0952* 0.3365 
boot p-value 0.4823 0.6189 0.5658 0.6259 0.1601 0.2611 0.1674 0.3206 
ROA 0.2148 0.5436 0.0762 0.1119     
p-value 0.6804 0.4528 0.8850 0.8723     
boot p-value 0.9158 0.9126 0.9558 0.9788     
SIZE 0.0136 -0.0260 0.0007 -0.0369     
p-value 0.7555 0.5251 0.9855 0.3200     
boot p-value 0.5799 0.4596 0.5011 0.4603     
AGE -0.1785 -0.3075 -0.1997 -0.3644     
p-value 0.1390 0.0721* 0.0904* 0.0263**     
boot p-value 0.2010 0.1260 0.1759 0.1039     
FINLEV -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005     
p-value 0.5638 0.8234 0.6462 0.7263     
boot p-value 0.4713 0.4965 0.4795 0.4993     
RISK 12.3160 8.3288 10.9414 6.6730 9.3951 7.5235 7.9365 4.7071 
p-value 0.0064*** 0.0873* 0.0052*** 0.1458 0.0014*** 0.0516* 0.0024*** 0.2157 
boot p-value 0.8635 0.6582 0.7833 0.6163 0.0176** 0.1088 0.0234*** 0.2950 
ZSCORE -0.0092 -0.0065 -0.0085 -0.0066 -0.0044  -0.0038  
p-value 0.0006*** 0.0442 0.0007*** 0.0367** 0.0004***  0.0010***  
boot p-value 0.2321 0.3344 0.2672 0.3438 0.0019***  0.0043***  
EPS -0.0019 0.0300 0.0038 0.0361**     
p-value 0.9315 0.2963 0.8550 0.2292     
boot p-value 0.4869 0.5616 0.5010 0.5911     
SEO 0.0133 0.0408 0.0010 -0.0270     
p-value 0.8391 0.6259 0.9878 0.7500     
boot p-value 0.9928 0.5056 0.9886 0.4810     
BROKREP  -0.0947 -0.1260 -0.0960 -0.0971     
p-value 0.2351 0.2116 0.2364 0.3195     
boot p-value 0.3620 0.3718 0.3435 0.4076     
AUDITREP 0.1595 0.2077 0.1507 0.1995 0.1142 0.2043 0.1184 0.2137 
p-value 0.0242** 0.0137** 0.0282** 0.0168** 0.0122** 0.0820* 0.0110** 0.0046*** 
boot p-value 0.6197 0.5447 0.6003 0.5461 0.0406** 0.0236** 0.0038** 0.0170*** 
Adjusted R2 0.2804 0.2013 0.2664 0.2140 0.2524 0.2179 0.2130 0.1714 
F-VALUE 2.4420 1.9328 2.3438 2.0075 5.8385 6.9908 4.8797 5.4467 
Prob.(F) 0.0317** 0.0844* 0.0383** 0.0731* 0.0021*** 0.0024*** 0.0055*** 0.0080*** 
White’s test p-value  (1980)  0.1461 0.1121 0.1603 0.0867* 0.4295 0.5777 0.6113 0.5474 
